



and waited a few moments to see the helicopter pilot's actions. The Sea King then started to turn R through 180° and head S which put both ac onto a collision course. He elected to avoid a collision by a fast descent below the helicopter which passed 300ft above and 100m clear but it caused him to slightly penetrate the Beverly ATZ. At the time he was unable to turn around as the Wx and visibility was deteriorating owing to drizzle that had started to fall. A few moments later the Sea King crew spotted his ac, he thought, and spoke to the controller about his ac crossing into the ATZ. He believed the controller did not see the Airprox as he was called moments later by the controller to confirm if he had entered the ATZ. He felt that he was under pressure and overwhelmed by the incident and so as not to inconvenience anyone he told the controller that he had not crossed into the ATZ as he believed it to be the case at the time. He considered that he had taken whatever actions were necessary to avoid the Airprox and collision.

**THE HUMBERSIDE RADAR CONTROLLER** reports on duty when the pilot of a Sea King made an initial call to report that he had flown close to a Cessna in the Beverley area and requesting if he was working any traffic of that type in the area. At the time the C152 was on frequency under a BS about 2nm NE of Beverley airfield on an E'ly track indicating 1400ft altitude and the only ac showing on radar in the vicinity. The pilot of the Sea King pilot was informed of the C152's position and he stated that he was considering filing an Airprox. Soon after the Sea King pilot changed to Leconfield frequency. The controller then asked the C152 pilot if he had seen the Sea King or called Beverley Radio for transit of the ATZ. He replied negative to both and added he had remained clear of the ATZ.

**ATSI** reports that the Airprox occurred at 1111:47 UTC, 2.2nm WSW of Beverley airfield and 1.25nm NE of Leconfield airfield. The Beverley ATZ comprises a circle radius 2nm centred on the mid-point of RW12/30 and extending to 2000ft above surface level (elevation 5ft). Beverley operate an A/G radio. Leconfield do not have an ATZ and also operate an A/G radio.

The Sea King was operating on a flight from Leconfield airfield as part of a 6-monthly Qualified Helicopter Instructor (QHI) check and was in communication with Beverley Radio.

The C152 was operating from Sandtoft airfield on a local VFR cross country flight and in receipt of a BS from Humberside Radar.

CAA ATSI had access to area radar recordings, together with the written report from both pilots. A request for RT recordings was not made within 30 days and therefore was not available.

METAR: EGNJ 261050Z 35010KT 9999 SCT014 BKN018 15/11 Q1016=  
METAR: EGNM 261050Z 01007KT 340V070 9999 SCT017 14/10 Q1016=

The C152 departed from Sandtoft and was in receipt of a BS from Humberside Radar, squawking 4271. The pilot's written report indicated flying a cross country flight in order to build up hours.

At 1107:01 the radar recording shows the C152, 8.1nm to the WSW of Beverley airfield indicating FL015 (1600ft QNH 1016mb). The Sea King was manoeuvring just to the NW of Leconfield airfield indicating unverified FL006 (700ft QNH).

At 1110:26 the radar recording shows the Sea King, 1.1nm N of Leconfield, tracking NNW, indicating FL009 (1000ft QNH) climbing and crossing ahead of the C152 from R to L at a range of 1.3nm. The C152 was tracking NE indicating FL014 (1500ft QNH).

At 1111:06 the radar recording shows the Sea King commencing a R turn with the C152 also turning R onto an E'ly track to pass 0.7nm S of the Sea King.

Sixteen seconds later at 1111:22, the distance between the 2 ac is 0.8nm, with the Sea King indicating FL017 (1800ft QNH) and the C152 indicating FL015 (1600ft QNH). The Sea King continued the R turn onto a S'ly heading as the 2 ac converge.

A further 16sec later the radar shows the 2 ac in close proximity at a position, 2.2nm to the WSW of Beverley airfield. The distance between the 2 ac is 0.3nm and the Sea King is crossing the C152 from L to R, indicating FL017 (1800ft QNH). The C152 is indicating a descent through FL014 (1500ft QNH).

The next sweep at 1111:46 the radar recording shows the 2 contacts merging, the Sea King is indicating FL017 (1800ft QNH) and the C152 FL013 (1400ft QNH).

The ac then quickly diverge, the Sea King maintaining indicating FL017 (1800ft QNH) and the C152, indicating FL012 (1300ft QNH). The C152 continues on the E'ly track, transiting through the Beverley ATZ.

The Sea King pilot contacted Humberside Radar and requested details of the C152. The controller's written report indicated that the C152 pilot reported that he had not seen the Sea King or called Beverley for transit of their ATZ, adding that he had remained clear of the Beverley ATZ.

The C152 was operating under VFR, in receipt of a BS from Humberside Radar. CAP 774, UK Flight Information Services, Chapter 2, Page 1. Paragraphs 1 & 5, state:

'A Basic Service is an ATS provided for the purpose of giving advice and information useful for the safe and efficient conduct of flights. This may include weather information, changes of serviceability of facilities, conditions at aerodromes, general airspace activity information, and any other information likely to affect safety. The avoidance of other traffic is solely the pilot's responsibility.'

'Pilots should not expect any form of traffic information from a controller, as there is no such obligation placed on the controller under a Basic Service outside an Aerodrome Traffic Zone (ATZ), and the pilot remains responsible for collision avoidance at all times. However, on initial contact the controller may provide traffic information in general terms to assist with the pilot's situational awareness. This will not normally be updated by the controller unless the situation has changed markedly, or the pilot requests an update. A controller with access to surveillance derived information shall avoid the routine provision of traffic information on specific aircraft, and a pilot who considers that he requires such a regular flow of specific traffic information shall request a Traffic Service. However, if a controller considers that a definite risk of collision exists, a warning may be issued to the pilot.'

The Airprox occurred when the C152 and the Sea King came into close proximity, whilst operating VFR in Class G airspace. The C152 was in receipt of a BS from Humberside Radar. Under a BS there is no obligation placed upon the controller to provide TI.

## **PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS**

Information available included reports from the pilots of both ac, transcripts of the relevant RT frequencies, radar video recordings, reports from the air traffic controllers involved and reports from the appropriate ATC authorities.

It was clear that there were two different viewpoints on this incident. The Sea King departed Leconfield to the N and climbed to 1500ft, passing over 1nm ahead of the C152 approaching from the W, which the crew did not see, prior to turning back to the S towards the airfield. It was only after rolling-out S'bound that the QHI saw the Cessna in his 0130 position, about 100ft below, and executed a R turn to pass behind it by 50m. Meanwhile the C152 pilot saw the Sea King taking-off and slowed down to give way to it, as it was on his R, and watched it pass ahead at almost the same level. When the Sea King then turned onto a conflicting course, although the C152 pilot had right of way, he wisely elected not to let the conflict develop. Rather, he descended, passing, he estimated, 300ft below and 100m clear; this separation was borne out by the radar recording which shows 400ft as the returns merge. Members agreed that the C152 should have been visible to the Sea King crew

as they crossed ahead of, but it would have been difficult to spot at that range and aspect. Once the Sea King was in its R turn on to a S'y heading, the crew had seen the C152 at the earliest opportunity and that this incident had been a conflict where the actions taken by both crews had been effective in removing the risk of collision.

**PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK**

Cause: A conflict in Class G airspace resolved by the pilots of both ac.

Degree of Risk: C.